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Stagg: The Avoidance of Releases
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

THE AVOIDANCE OF RELEASES
Just how final is a release? After execution of a compromise and
settlement agreement, a releasee doubtless feels entitled to rely upon
the language of discharge. However, despite the verbiage of a typical
release,1 the releasee often is confronted with an action for damages
arising out of the very injury which led to the settlement. The outcome of this litigation will be determined by the myriad of principles
involved in setting aside and avoiding the effect of a release.
Perhaps nowhere can the flexibility of the common law be more
pointedly demonstrated than in the exhaustive litigation of releases
for accidents resulting in personal injury. The judiciary has been the
referee of these frequent bouts. Policy factors kneel in the respective
corners of the antagonists - the encouragement of compromises 2 at
times clashing squarely with the need for adequate compensation of
accident victims and a desire to shield an injured party from the
often overwhelming bargaining power of a claims agent or adjuster.
Thus the peculiar facts and equitable considerations in each instance
often dictate the judicial decision. This appears to be the underlying
explanation for the inconsistencies encountered in this area. The
courts have displayed a commendable readiness to sacrifice legal
exactitude in an attempt to reach results which will prove just under
the circumstances of each controversy.
GROUNDS FOR AVOIDANCE

Any of the familiar grounds employed in setting aside contracts
are equally applicable to releases. Fraud, 3 mistake, 4 duress or undue
'A common form for a release might include the following language: "I, [releasor], do hereby, on behalf of myself, my heirs, executor, administrators, assigns,
servants, agents, and employees, remise, release and forever discharge [releasee],
his servants, agents, employees, successors, or assigns, of and from any and all
debts, demands, actions, causes of action, damages and liability whatsoever, both
in law and in equity, which I have or may in the future have, against the said
[releasee]."

2DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1957); Florida East Coast Ry.
v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 30, 111 So. 525 (1927).
3E.g., Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1950);
Putnam Lumber Co. v. Berry, 146 Fla. 595, 2 So.2d 133 (1941); Florida East Coast
Ry. v. Thompson, supra note 2; Crigger v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 17
Tenn. App. 636, 69 S.W.2d 907 (1933).
4E.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Zimmer, 87 Cal. App. 2d 524, 197 P.2d 363 (1948);
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influence, 5 and incapacity of the releasing party6 accordingly comprise
the principal justifications for setting aside releases. Although occasionally a direct action is brought for damages for fraud practiced
in obtaining a release7 this note will be confined to cases in which
an injured party brings an action against the releasee and attempts
to set aside the settlement agreement on one or more of the above
grounds. It will be concerned principally with fraud and mistake,
the theories most often used.
The line of demarcation separating these two theories is often
obscure, particularly so since counsel often press both doctrines alternatively. If no intentional deception appears, the question of constructive fraud occasionally is presented. The niceties of distinguishing between these theories is of little practical importance, however,
as the courts seem to avail themselves of whichever effectuates a
suitable result.
Fraud
With the widespread increase in personal injury litigation and
the concurrent development of negotiation and settlement practices,
the modern judicial trend has been to relieve injured parties from
the effects of fraudulently obtained releases. 8
The usual categories of fraud9 are recognized by most courts in
this connection. Accordingly, the weight of authority seems to be
that a release obtained by fraud in the factum, or execution, is void,
whereas one involving fraud in the treaty, or inducement, is voidable
at the election of the releasor. 10
Boole v. Florida Power & Light Co., 147 Fla. 589, 3 So.2d 335 (1941); Collins v.
Hughes & Riddle, 134 Neb. 380, 278 N.W. 888 (1938).
5E.g., Perkins Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, 197 Ark. 14, 121 S.W.2d 877 (1938); Wise

v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950); McCoy v. James T.
McMahon Constr. Co., 216 S.W. 770 (Mo. 1919).
6E.g., Carey v. Levy, 329 Mich. 458, 45 N.W.2d 352 (1951); State ex rel. United
Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Shain, 349 Mo. 460, 162 S.W.2d 255 (1942); Gibson v. Western
New York & P.R.R., 164 Pa. 142, 30 Ad. 308 (1894).
7See cases cited in Annots., 134 A.L.R. 6, 75 (1941); 96 A.L.R. 1001, 1014 (1935).
SDice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1953).
9PROssER, TORTS 527 (2d ed. 1955).
'oSee, e.g., Graham v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 176 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1949);
In re Clark's Estate, 318 Mich. 92, 27 N.W.2d 509 (1947); Ulrich v. McDonough, 89
Ohio App. 178, 101 N.E.2d 163 (1950); Picklesimer v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 151 Ohio
St. 1, 84 N.E.2d 214 (1949).
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A 1927 release case decided by the Florida Supreme Court formulated a somewhat unique characterization, declaring that a contract
procured by fraud was voidable by the innocent party but void as to
the wrongdoer." The implications of this holding are not entirely
clear. A more recent decision expressly repudiated the distinction
between fraud in the execution and inducement in a controversy over
the jurisdiction of law or equity. 12 Should this rejection of categories
be extended, Florida might hold that fraud of any type would render
a release void, a position that perhaps has some support.' 3 Moreover,
the distinction appears academic, because a void release will remain
in practical effect until some action is taken by the releasor.
Generally, the misrepresentation required to prove fraud must be
as to some past or present existing fact 1 - not a mere opinion as to

the probable course of future events.' 5 Despite the certainty with
which this principle is expressed, no such precision appears in its
application.
A false representation of law to the releasor has been sustained
as a valid basis for relief from a release,16 particularly when the releasee possessed some superior knowledge and the releasor had some
reason to rely on his statement.

7

But recovery has been barred by

some courts, which have held the statement in dispute to be merely
an expression of opinion as to the law involved.' 8
In the case of a physician's statement as to the releasor's physical
condition, relief would seem to be allowed for expressions concerning
the then existing condition but not for statements as to the probable
consequences of the injury.' 9 But at least one court has treated a
"Florida East Coast Ry. v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 30, 35, 111 So. 525, 527 (1927).
"2McGill v. Henderson, 98 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1957).
13Cf. Crigger v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 17 Tenn. App. 636, 69
S.W.2d 907 (1933).
' 4Valley v. Boston & Me. R.R., 103 Me. 106 (1907); Prince v. Kansas City So.
Ry., 360 Mo. 580, 229 S.W.2d 568 (1950); Macklin v. Fogel Constr. Co., 326 Mo. 38,
31 S.W.2d 14 (1930).
"5See DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1957).
IsSainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1950);
Graham v. Weber, 79 N.H. 393, 109 At. 717 (1920); Madison Trust Co. v.
Helleckson, 216 Wis. 443, 257 N.W. 691 (1934).
"7See Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1950).
1SChesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Chaffin, 184 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 935 (1951); Valley v. Boston & Me. R.R., 103 Me. 106, 68 At. 635 (1907);
Harris v. Sanderson, 178 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
19Ozan Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Ward, infra note 20; Prince v. Kansas City
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physician's statement that an injury was temporary as a representation
of fact rather than a mere opinion as to future probabilities. 20 An
injured party is apparently able to rely on statements of an alleged
tort-feasor's physician. 21 Fraud as to the extent and nature of a claim
covered by a settlement agreement has also been held sufficient to
invalidate the release.22

In accord with the principles generally applicable to fraud,
statements made by a releasee recklessly and without knowledge of
their truth or falsity will sustain a claim of fraud, although there be
no actual intent to deceive.23 Further, the doctrine of constructive
fraud has been imposed in some cases involving an innocent misrepresentation of a material fact.24
Mistake
In order to justify the rescission of a release for mistake and allow
the plaintiff to recover in a subsequent action for damages, the mistake
must be mutual and not merely unilateral.25 A more difficult problem
is the kind of mistake that will justify setting aside a settlement.
When the releasor was fully aware of the extent of his injuries,
and signed the agreement because he believed he had no cause of
action against the releasee, it has been held that mistake of law is not
26
a ground for avoiding a release.
A mutual mistake must have been made as to a past or present
existing fact, as in the case of fraud; a mere opinion as to future conSo. Ry., 360 Mo. 580, 229 S.W.2d 568 (1950); Macklin v. Fogel Constr. Co. 326 Mo.
38, 31 S.W.2d 14 (1930).
2
00zan Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Ward, 188 Ark. 557, 66 S.W.2d 1074 (1934).
2
lBass v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 205 Ga. 458, 53 S.E.2d 895 (1949).
22Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946).
23Graham v. Weber, 79 N.H. 393, 109 At. 717 (1920).
24Bowie v. Sorrell, 113 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 209
F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953); Bass v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., supra note 21; Mix v.
Downing, 176 Minn. 156, 222 N.W. 913 (1929); Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328,
57 N.W.2d 381 (1953). The courts do not always use the term constructive fraud,
although the results seem grounded upon the doctrine.
2tNoble v. Farris, 221 F.2d 950 (Ist Cir. 1955); Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v.
Smith, 126 Ind. App. 332, 133 N.E.2d 72 (1956); Doyle v. Teasdale, supra note 24.
At least one court has applied the constructive fraud theory to a unilateral mistake.
See Mix v. Downing, 176 Minn. 156, 159, 222 N.W. 913, 915 (1929) (dictum). But
cf. Davis v. Whatley, 175 So. 422 (La. 1937) (unilateral mistake held "no meeting
of the minds," hence no contract).
26Schwieger v. Harry W. Robbins & Co., 48 Wash. 2d 22, 290 P.2d 984 (1955).
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sequences of injuries will not justify avoidance.27 The qualification
has been variously phrased'2 8 but the general import of the requirement is that, to warrant setting aside a release, it must appear from
the nature of the injuries that the subsequent developments could
not have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time the
release was executed.29 The difficulty of applying this requirement
may be illustrated by a comparison of two Florida cases. In Boole v.
Florida Power & Light Co. 30 a cardiac patient suffered an injury
that was diagnosed as a minor chest contusion. After executing
a release for fifteen dollars the victim died from an aggravation of
his heart condition caused by the injury. The Supreme Court, in a
four-to-three decision, reversed a directed verdict for the defendant,
allowing the case to go to the jury on the issue of mutual mistake.31
This case was subsequently distinguished in DeWitt v. Miami Transit
32
Co.,
in which an accident victim contended that she had executed
a release in the belief that she had merely suffered a slight injury to
her lower back, while in reality a congenital back condition had been
aggravated, necessitating surgery. The Court said that there was no
mistake "as to the injury itself," 33 as there was in the Boole case. This

qualification, it seems, has proved to be an escape valve for the judiciary. Thus the courts may construe the mistake as pertaining
either to the injury or to its seriousness, in order to allow or deny
recovery as the exigencies of the situations dictate.
2

7See, e.g., Tulsa City Lines, Inc. v. Mains, 107 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1939);
Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry, 319 Mass. 386, 65 N.E.2d 918 (1946); Dolgner v.
Dayton Co., 182 Minn. 588, 235 N.W. 275 (1931); Collins v. Hughes & Riddle, 134
Neb. 380, 278 N.W. 888 (1938).
2
sSee, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Zimmer, 87 Cal. App. 2d 524, 197 P.2d 363
(1948) (nature or seriousness of injury); Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry, Inc.,
supra note 27 (injuries "not known or suspected" at time of settlement); Reinhardt v. Wilbur, 30 N.J. Super. 502, 105 A.2d 415 (App. Div. 1954) (that injury
subsequently becomes more serious than believed not basis for avoidance); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn. 421, 426, 70 S.W.2d 361, 362 (1934)
(dictum) (nature and extent of injuries); Jandrt v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 255
Wis. 618, 626, 39 N.W.2d 698, 702 (1949) (dictum) (no avoidance merely because
injuries prove more serious).
2
9See Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570 (1953).
'40147 Fla. 589, 3 So.2d 335 (1941).
alAdams, J., dissenting, said that the fact that unexpected consequences result
from the known facts is the "prime reason to actuate compromise." 147 Fla. at 597,
3 So.2d at 338.
3295

So.2d 898 (Fla. 1957).

331d. at 901.
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If the parties to an agreement fix the compensation while uncertain about the extent of the releasor's injuries, the release will be
given full effect. 34 This result is doctrinally justifiable in promoting
freedom of contract, in that the releasor assumes the risk of the injuries. It has been indicated that an injured party has some duty
to make reasonable inquiries before he may rely on any representations as to the nature and extent of his injuries. 35
Other Grounds
Duress, or undue influence, will ordinarily render a release voidable 36 or, under some circumstances, void.3 7 The general test suggested by the cases is whether the releasor's free will was actually overcome by the coercion employed. 38
A release that is executed by a mentally incompetent person is
usually held voidable. 39 It has also been held that such an agreement
is presumptively fraudulent,40 and there is some authority that such
a contract is void. 4 3 An essential element of avoidance for fraud in
Florida is the releasee's knowledge, at the time of execution of the
42
release, of the releasor's mental incapacity.
FactualConsiderations
Of vital importance to a treatment of the doctrinal problems in
this area is an analysis of the various additional facts and circum34
Hanson v. Northern States Power Co., 198 Minn. 24, 268 N.W. 642 (1936);
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Watkins, 90 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
3sHetrick v. Yellow Cab Co., 167 Wash. 135, 8 P.2d 992 (1932).
S6Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Reed, 220 Miss. 794, 72 So.2d 197 (1954); McCoy v.
James T. McMahon Constr. Co., 216 S.W. 770 (Mo. 1919).
37Perkins Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, 197 Ark. 14, 121 S.W.2d 877 (1938); McCoy v.
James T. McMahon Constr. Co., supra note 36, at 771 (dictum).
38Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 42 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1950).
39
Komer v. Shipley, 154 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1946); Bowie v. Sorrell, 113 F. Supp.
373 (W.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953); State ex rel.
United Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Shain, 349 Mo. 460, 162 S.W.2d 255 (1942); cf. Putnam
Lumber Co. v. Berry, 146 Fla. 595, 2 So.2d 133 (1941) (apparently decided on
fraud).
40Cf. Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 9 Ill. App. 2d 182, 132 N.E.2d 558 (1956)
(interpreting statute on contracts with incompetents).
4'Kelly v. Louisville & N.R.R., 154 Ala. 573, 578, 45 So. 906, 907 (1908) (dictum);
cf. Wetzstein v. Thomasson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 554, 93 P-2d 1028 (1939).
42
Vasquez v. Simms, 75 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1954).
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stances in the cases. A balance of equities may often be the key to
the decisions.
Adequacy of the consideration is among the more significant factors. Although probably a pertinent inquiry in every such case, direct
discussion of this point is not common. Courts that have discussed
this factor generally concede that mere inadequacy of consideration
will not in itself justify setting aside a release, 4 but hasten to add
that it may be strong evidence of fraud or mistake.44 There is some
authority that gross inadequacy may raise a presumption of fraud. 45

Further, the amount may be so extremely inadequate as to shock the
conscience of the court and in itself justify rescission.46
The fact that a release was executed within a very short time
after an accident, although seldom directly referred to by courts,
probably helps establish fraud or undue influence.4 7 Statutory provisions dealing with this problem will be considered below.
The mental condition of the releasor, even though not constituting
incapacitation, may often prove a material factor.48 However, mere
disparity in capacity between the contracting parties has been held
not sufficient to warrant setting aside such an agreement.4 9 Similarly,
it has been held that mere lack of knowledge of the subject matter
contained in a release is not a ground for rescission5 0
43Dolgner v. Dayton Co., 182 Minn. 588, 235 N.W. 275 (1931); Kavadas v. St.
Louis S.W. Ry., 263 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. App. 1954); Watkins v. Grier, 224 N.C. 339,
30 S.E.2d 223 (1944); Lowery v. Callahan, 210 S.C. 300, 42 S.E.2d 457 (1947); Doyle
v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953).
44McGregor v. Mills, 280 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1955); Vondera v. Chapman, 352 Mo.
1034, 180 S.W.2d 704 (1944); Doyle v. Teasdale, supra note 43; Jandrt v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 255 Wis. 618, 39 N.W.2d 698 (1949). See also Winter Park Tel.
Co. v. Strong, 130 Fla. 755, 179 So. 289 (1937); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Horn,
100 Fla. 1339, 131 So. 219 (1930).
45E. 1. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kelly, 252 Fed. 523 (4th Cir. 1918). See
also Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Robinson, 191 Ark. 428, 434, 86 S.W.2d 913, 916
(1935) (dictum).
4
0Weger v. Rocha, 138 Cal. App. 109, 32 P.2d 417 (1934) (original consideration
was $475; verdict in excess of $8,000 not questioned as excessive); cf. Seaboard Air
Line R.R. v. Gill, 227 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1955).
47See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Horn, infra note 48; McGregor v. Mills,
supra note 44; Jones v. Alabama & V. Ry., 72 Miss. 22, 16 So. 379 (1894); Schubert
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 358 Mo. 303, 214 S.W.2d 420 (1948).
48Florida Power & Light Co. v. Horn, 100 Fla. 1339, 131 So. 219 (1930).
49Dundee Chem. Works v. Conner, 17 Atd. 975 (N.J. Ch. 1889), rev'd, 46 N.J.
Eq. 576, 20 Atl. 50 (Ct. Err. & App. 1890). But cf. Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1950).
5OPanhandle & S.F. Ry. v. O'Neal, 119 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
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If the injured party opens the negotiations that lead to a settlement, the likelihood that the release will be fairly bargained for
would seem greater than if negotiations are instigated by the alleged
tort-feasor.52 The fact that a claimant relies on his own physician's
2
representations as to the seriousness of his injuries may be important.5
The releasor's belief that he is merely signing a receipt for payments
made by the releasee is a strong indication of fraud.53 The subsequent
death of the releasor, although indicated in at least one instance as
evincing no fraud or mistake,5 4 might prove an inducement to set
aside a release.
RELATED PROBLEMS

Restoration of the Status Quo
Whether return or tender of the consideration received for a release is a condition precedent to a subsequent action on the claim
is a perplexing problem. The courts have announced at least three
positions on this question when fraud is advanced to avoid a release.
That tender is a condition precedent was justified in the federal
courts at an early date in light of the public policy to promote settle56
ments.5 5 This proposition has maintained considerable support.
Another school of thought eliminates any necessity for tender if the
release is void for fraud in its execution, but requires restoration of
the status quo if the fraud was in the inducement. 57 A third approach
eliminates the requirement in any case of fraud.58 Florida's position
5iSee Valley v. Boston & Me. R.R., 103 Me. 106, 68 At. 635 (1907).
S2See Tulsa City Lines v. Mains, 107 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1939); Jordan v. Brady
Transfer & Storage Co., 226 Iowa 138, 284 N.W. 73 (1939).
5-Platt v. American Cement Plaster Co., 169 Iowa 330, 151 N.W. 403 (1915);
Davis v. Whatley, 175 So. 422 (La. 1937); Palkovitz v. American Sheet & Tin Plate
Co., 266 Pa. 176, 109 AtI. 789 (1920); cf. Moses v. Carver, 254 App. Div. 402, 5
N.Y.S.2d 783 (3d Dep't 1938).
54Goodyear v. Davis, 121 Kan. 392, 247 Pac. 446 (1926).
55Vandervelden v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 61 Fed. 54 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1894).
5GHarrison v. Alabama Midland Ry., 144 Ala. 246, 40 So. 394 (1906); Drew v.
Lyle, 88 Ga. App. 121, 76 S.E.2d 142 (1953); Davis v. Whatley, 175 So. 422 (La.
App. 1937); Swan v. Great No. Ry., 40 N.D. 258, 168 N.W. 657 (1918).
57Graham v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 176 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1949); Picklesimer
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 151 Ohio St. 1, 84 N.E.2d 214 (1949); In re Clark's Estate,
318 Mich. 92, 27 N.W.2d 509 (1947); Watson v. Bugg, 365 Mo. 191, 280 S.W.2d 67
(1955).
SSMarshall v. New York Cent. R.R., 218 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1955); Calvert Fire
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does not appear to have been expressed. However, in view of the
Florida Supreme Court's repudiation of the distinction between fraud
in the execution and inducement as affecting a jurisdictional question,5 9 this state might well adopt the third view.
In some cases failure of tender has not proved fatal when the
verdict credited the settlement amount against the damages.60 There
is authority that a releasor is under no obligation to tender an amount
that proves grossly inadequate, providing it is credited to the trial
judgment."' If the consideration for the release was in satisfaction of
a claim other than the one at trial, tender is not required.6 2 Furthermore, if it appears that tender would have been refused, the futility
of such a gesture seems to be a valid excuse.6 3 Several cases have sustained the proposition that inability to return the consideration will
4
obviate any necessity for tender.6

Failure to return or tender the consideration generally is held
fatal to an attempt to set aside a release for mistake, 65 duress,66 or

mental incapacity.67
Conduct of the Releasor
If tender is considered a condition precedent, a related problem
Ins. Co. v. Eaton, 226 Ark. 338, 289 S.W.2d 896 (1956); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n
v. Kennedy, 135 Tex. 486, 143 S.W.2d 583 (1940).
59McGill v. Henderson, 98 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1957).
6OLion Oil Refining Co. v. Albritton, 21 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1927); Peterson v.
A. Guthrie & Co., 3 F. Supp. 136 (W.D. Wash. 1933); Collins v. Hughes & Riddle,
134 Neb. 380, 278 N.W. 888 (1938);

accord, RESTATEMENT,

CONTRACrS §480 (2) (c)

(1932).
6lKoshka v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 114 Kan. 126, 217 Pac. 293 (1923).
62Wetzstein v. Thomasson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 554, 93 P.2d 1028 (1939); Malloy
v. Chicago Great W.R.R., 185 Iowa 346, 170 N.W. 481 (1919); Hubbard's Adm'r
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 267 Ky. 435, 102 S.W.2d 343 (1937).
63Cf. Ipock v. Atlantic & N.C.R.R., 158 N.C. 445, 74 S.E. 352 (1912); Weger v.
Rocha, 138 Cal. App. 109, 117, 32 P.2d 417, 421 (1934) (dictum).
64Rase v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 118 Minn. 437, 137 N.W. 176
(1912); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 11 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928). See also Fraser v. Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941) (plaintiff not
required to tender settlement proceeds paid directly to doctor or spouse). Contra,
Bailey v. Indianapolis Abattoir Co., 66 Ind. App. 465, 118 N.E. 374 (1918).
65Seymour v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 181 Iowa 218, 164 N.W. 352 (1917).
66Gilbert v. Wilson, 237 Ala. 645, 188 So. 260 (1939); Wise v. Midtown Motors,
Inc., 42 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1950); Davis v. Hargett, 244 N.C. 157, 92 S.E.2d 782
(1956). Contra, Perkins Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, 197 Ark. 14, 121 S.W.2d 877 (1938).
67Carey v. Levy, 329 Mich. 458, 45 N.W.2d 352 (1951); Gibson v. Western New
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may arise if the releasor retains the consideration after learning of
the ground that would invalidate the release. If the retention was
for an unreasonable time under the circumstances, it has been held
to amount to ratification of the release contract, which will estop
the releasor from subsequently contesting its validity.18 Here again
the courts are left to an almost unfettered exercise of discretion in
attempting to do justice to the parties involved.
The distinction between ratification and laches is not always
pronounced. Generally, however, laches involves delay in bringing
suit as opposed to tardiness in disclaiming the release. Further, laches
seems to require more than mere delay, contemplating a lapse of time
that works some real disadvantage to the other party. 69
The JurisdictionalQuestion
Whether a plaintiff may advance fraud, mistake, or duress to avoid
a release in a law action for damages, or whether such issues are confined to equity, is another question on which there is no unanimity.
The original rule, formulated not without dissent,70 was that the only
defense of which the plaintiff could avail himself at law was that
of fraud in the execution, leaving fraud in the inducement and mistake under equitable jurisdiction.71 The law court generally would
agree to postpone its trial to allow the plaintiff to file a direct proceeding in equity for rescission of the release.72 As joinder of law and
equity grew in popularity, this distinction became academic. 73
York & P.R.R., 164 Pa. 142, 30 At. 308 (1894). But see State ex rel. United Mut.
Ins. Ass'n v. Shain, 349 Mo. 460, 162 S.W.2d 255 (1942).
08Komer v. Shipley, 154 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1946); Minton v. Hall, 218 Ark. 92,
234 S.W.2d 515 (1950); Presnell v. Liner, 218 N.C. 152, 10 S.E.2d 639 (1940); see
Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 757 (1957).
692 POM.ROY, Equrry JURISPRUDENCE §419 (d) (1941). But cf. Robert Hind,
Ltd. v. Silva, 75 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1935).
7oCf. Malloy v. Chicago Great W.R.R., 185 Iowa 346, 170 N.W. 481 (1919);
Reddington v. Blue, 168 Iowa 34, 149 N.W. 933 (1914).
7'Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp. v. Soerling, 239 Fed. 715 (2d Cir. 1917);
Mclsaac v. McMurray, 77 N.H. 466, 93 Atl. 115 (1915).
72Vandervelden v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 61 Fed. 54 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1894).
73See Reinhardt v. Wilbur, 30 N.J. Super. 502, 505, 105 A.2d 415, 417 (App.
Div. 1954) (dictum). In Bowie v. Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953), in which
a release was obtained by an insurance adjuster, the court ruled that the trial
judge properly ordered a separate trial on the release's validity, thus avoiding the
possible mention of insurance before the jury.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court has retained this distinction in
part by allowing pleas of fraud to be accepted by the law court, but
continues to send the plaintiff to equity if he pleads mistake. 74 Florida
has allowed pleas of mistake in actions at law.- The next logical step
was taken in a recent Florida Supreme Court decision.7 6 The Court
rejected the inducement-execution distinction and placed in one
category, triable at law, all pleas of fraud when a release is concerned.
Evidentiary Problems
The burden of proving that a release was wrongfully obtained is
on the party who attacks

7

it.

The standard of proof ordinarily is

that the fraud, or other ground, must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.78 One who sets up a seaman's release, in keeping
with the peculiarities of admiralty, must prove that it was executed
freely and voluntarily, without deception or coercion.79
Although there is conflict over the applicability of the parol evidence rule to this situation,80 the door has been opened in Florida to
the admission of oral testimony in contradiction of a release. The
Florida Supreme Court has said: "While [a release's] terms may not
be varied by parol evidence, it is competent to prove that the instrument was procured in violation of law."'
Drafting Techniques
A release worded to cover "unknown injuries" might preclude
a subsequent recovery,8 2 but the majority of cases indicate that the
74See Greer v. J. T. Fargason Grocer Co., 168 Tenn. 242, 77 S.W.2d ,443 (1935).
75DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1957); Boole v. Florida
Power & Light Co., 147 Fla. 589, 3 So.2d 335 (1941).
76McGill v. Henderson, 98 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1957).
77Union Compress & Whse. Co. v. Shaw, 187 Ark. 249, 59 S.W.2d 1021 (1933);
Florida East Coast Ry. v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 30, 111 So. 525 (1927); Macklin v.
Fogel Constr. Co., 326 Mo. 38, 31 S.W.2d 14 (1930); accord, Callen v. Pennsylvania

R.R. 332 U.S. 625 (1947).
78E.g., Colorado Springs & I. Ry. v. Huntling, 66 Colo. 515, 181 Pac. 129 (1919);
Goodyear v. Davis, 121 Kan. 392, 247 Pac. 446 (1926); Davis v. Higgins, 95 Okla.
32, 217 Pac. 193 (1923).
79Garret v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
soCf. Lion Oil Refining Co. v. Albritton, 21 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1927); Reid v.
Lowden, 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939); McIsaac v. McMurray, 77 N.H. 466, 93
AtI. 115 (1915); K. C. Motor Co. v. Miller, 185 Okla. 84, 90 P.2d 433 (1939).
8
lRoper v. Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709, 714, 179 So. 904, 906 (1938).
S2Kostick v. Swain, 116 Cal. App. 2d 187, 253 P.2d 531 (1953); Serr v. Biwabik
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courts will inquire as to whether this was actually intended by the
parties at the time of contracting.
Florida has allowed recovery in
the face of similar provisions in settlement agreements."Two Arkansas cases have considered clauses in which the releasor
stated that he relied solely on his own judgment and belief as to the
nature and extent of his injuries and executed the release without
inducement. The court in each case refused to effectuate the language
when the proof indicated that the representation was not accurate.8 5
The cautious draftsman should consider including similar language
in an effort to create some written manifestation of intent that the
agreement was in fact a final and conclusive settlement.
Legislative Efforts
At least ten states8 6 have turned to legislation in an attempt to
solve some of the problems in this area. Among the more noteworthy statutes is Tennessee's.8 7 It provides that a prior settlement
shall not bar a plaintiff's action unless it is affirmatively shown that
the agreement was made after the cause of action arose and with
the express written consent of the plaintiff, and it eliminates the
tender requirement if a settlement is attacked for fraud or mistake.
Any consideration received must be credited against satisfaction of a
judgment subsequently procured.
Four states provide for avoiding releases executed within short
periods of time after an injury.8 This at first blush appears desirable;
Concrete Aggregate Co., 202 Minn. 165, 278 N.W. 355 (1938).
83See Atlantic Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Metz, 70 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 562 (1934); Union Pac. R.R. v. Zimmer, 87 Cal. App. 2d 524, 197
P.2d 363 (1948); Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570 (1953); Collins
v. Hughes & Riddle, 134 Neb. 380, 278 N.W. 888 (1938).
84DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1957); Boole v. Florida
Power & Light Co., 147 Fla. 589, 3 So.2d 335 (1941).
s5 Ozan Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Ward, 188 Ark. 557, 66 S.W.2d 1074 (1934);
Kiech Mfg. Co. v. James, 164 Ark. 137, 261 S.W. 24 (1924).
8sAla., Cal., Md., Mass., Minn., Mo., N.Y., N.D., Pa., Tenn.
87TENN. CODE ANN. §§23-3001,-3002 (Supp. 1958).
88MD. ANN. CODE art. 79, §10 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 271, §44 (1956);
MINN. STAT. §602.01 (1953); N.D. REv. CODE §§9.0808,-0809 (1943). In Maryland a
release signed within 5 days after an injury is voidable by the injured party within
60 days from the date of injury. In Massachusetts a release signed by a hospital
patient within 15 days is inadmissible and void unless the injured party, at least
5 days prior to executing the release, signified his assent. The Minnesota provision
shifts the burden of proof so that a release executed within 30 days of the date of
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it protects a victim from a hurry-up settlement solicited by an unscrupulous agent. A question is posed, however, as to whether this
would preclude an early settlement no matter how urgent might be
the injured person's need for ready cash. North Dakota further
provides that an amount received by the releasor may be recovered
as a counterclaim or applied to an ultimate damage award. 89 The
constitutionality of the time-limit section of its code has been upheld
as against freedom of contract and equal protection contentions.9°
CONCLUSION

The uncertainty in this area does not call for further rigidity in
the applicable law. The elusive nature of the concepts allows the
judiciary to achieve an equitable decision in accordance with the
facts presented in each instance. Any restrictions would add to the
possibility of an undue obstruction of justice under particular circumstances; this is not an area well adapted to mechanical regulation.
It is highly desirable to continue to leave open to the courts the
widest possible avenues down which they may maneuver the factual
situations in order to reach results consonant with the circumstances
presented, while preserving the delicate bargaining balances necessary to achieve harmonious compromises.
C. LAWRENCE STAGG

injury is presumed fraudulent. The North Dakota statute provides that a release
made within 30 days remains voidable for 6 months after the date of injury. N.Y.
PEN. LAW §270-b makes it a misdemeanor to enter a hospital for the purpose of
negotiating a settlement within 15 days after the injury is sustained, unless the
injured party has signified his assent at least 5 days prior to entering the hospital.
This section would not render a release obtained in violation thereof void, but it
might be considered together with the other circumstances in determining whether
a releasee's conduct was improper. Thorne v. Columbia Cab Corp., 167 Misc. 72, 3
N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. City Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 168 Misc. 255, 5 N.Y.S.2d 775
(Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd mem., 256 App. Div. 906, 10 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1st Dep't 1939).
89N.D. REv. CODE §9.0809 (1943).
9oPeterson v. Penovitz, 62 N.D. 328, 243 N.W. 798 (1932).
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